INTRODUCTION
Section 149(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act1 gives the court discretion to allow amendments to be made in the indictment or summons at any time before judgements if it considers that such amendment will not prejudice the accused in his defence. It provides:
Whenever, on the trial of any indictment or summons, there appears to be any variance between the statement therein and evidence offered in proof of such statement, or if it appears that any words or particulars that ought to have been inserted in the indictment or summons have been omitted, or that there is any other error in the indictment or summons the court may at any time before judgment, if it considers that the making of the necessary amendment in the indictment or summons will not prejudice the accused in his defence, order that the indictment or summons be amended, so far as it is necessary, by some officer of the court or other person, both in that part thereof where the variance, omission, insertion, or error occurs, and in every other part thereof which it may become necessary to amend.
The general rule is that an amendment of a summons should be done before the accused pleads and not during reading of judgement or delivery thereof.2 However, in terms of this section, amendment m ay be applied for and granted at any time before judgement.
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of section 149(1) the extent of the power to amend conferred by this section has been the subject of conflicting decisions of the High Court.
The controversy has centred on what constitutes an "am endm ent" within the subsection. This paper seeks to analyse the judicial views expressed on the subsection and to ascertain which one is appropriate in the absence of a definitive opinion of the Court of Appeal.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SUBSECTION
Two views seem to have emerged from the case law. Some judges have been of the opinion that the w ord "am end" can and does include substituting an existing charge with a new one, while others were of the view that where an amendment had the effect of substituting a new charge then it w as invalid for it went beyond the meaning of the word "amend".
An exponent of the second view is Justice Corduff who expressed the view, in State v Lephole,3 that the section only provides for certain amendments to the particulars to bring the charge into line with evidence. He expressed himself thus:
1.

2.
Cap 08 In State v M oyo accused was charged with theft of stock. He pleaded guilty. The prosecutor accepted the plea and tendered to the Magistrate a statement of agreed facts. This was read over to the accused who, in reply, claimed that he had been compelled by terrorists on pain of death to steal the cattle. The magistrate altered the plea to not guilty. Thereupon the prosecutor advised that he intended to charge the accused with 14 counts of theft of stock in substitution for the charge before the court. Later the accused appeared before another Magistrate, who was aware that a plea of not guilty had been entered. In spite of such knowledge he permitted the prosecutor to put to the accused an entirely new charge which alleged the commission of 14 counts of theft of stock. He was asked to plead, and reiterated that he had stolen the cattle under compulsion. Pleas of not guilty were entered. He was convicted on all counts.
On review of the case the issue was whether an 'amendment' whereby a charge to which an accused had pleaded is substituted with an entirely new one was competent. Justice Gubbay observed that the amendment contemplated by section 19110 must be an amendment to the charge not the substitution o f an entirely new charge (Emphasis mine). The conviction and sentence were overturned. Similarly in the South African case of R v M uyekwa" Lewis J. held that the substitution of one offence for another w as not an amendment. In this case the accused had pleaded guilty to a charge of common assault. During the crown case and in view of the evidence led by the crown, the prosecutor applied for an amendment of a charge of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The Magistrate allowed the amendment and the accused was convicted on the new charge. Lewis J. held that the so-called amendment of the charge was not an amendment within the meaning of the Act12 but that "it was the substitution of an entirely new charge which was not competent".
The interpretation of section 149 preferred by Corduff was adopted and followed by Justice Barrington Jones in M onyamane v The State13 where he quashed the conviction and set aside the decision of the trial court on the basis that "the procedure adopted by the learned magistrate resulted in a serious irregularity" .u
In that case the trial court had allowed the changing of a charge of indecent assault to that of rape. In his Lordship's view, if during trial the prosecution realises that the indictment or charge sheet does not cover all the criminal conduct of the accused and wishes to add more charges against the accused, then the proper course that should be followed is for the prosecutor to seek leave to withdraw the case in terms of the proviso to the then section 2491s 0 f fjjg Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act at the time when the application is made to substitute the charge, and then lay fresh charge against the accused. where before trials or at any stage of a trial, it appears to the court that the indictment is defective, the court shall make such order for the amendment of the indictment as the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case, unless having regard to the merits of the case, the required amendments cannot be made without injustice, and may make such order as to the payment of any costs incurred owing to the necessity for amendment as the court thinks fit. The Court of Appeal has not yet intervened in this controversy so that it is likely that we will continue to see conflicting decisions over the interpretation of section 149(1) and the loser is our criminal justice system and indeed the accused who would be perturbed by like cases being treated differently. The situation cries out for court of appeal intervention.
In the English case of R v Johal and
COURT OF APPEAL'S INTERVENTION: WHICH WAY?
It is trite law that where the trial court has discretionary power the court of appeal is not entitled to substitute their discretion for that of the court of trial.26 The court can only interfere in cases where the court of trial had exceeded its jurisdiction or imposed a sentence, (in matters relating sentencing) which was not legally permissible for a crime or been influenced by facts or motives which were not appropriate for consideration. 27 The question under consideration does not interrogate the discretionary powers of courts of trial; that is not in dispute. W hat is at issue is whether the word 'am end' as used in section 149(1) should be given a narrower or broader meaning, that is, should the word 'am end' in the context of section 149(1) be interpreted to mean not only the perfecting of a charge but also the substitution or addition of new charges?
The arguments of Hannah J. are to a large extent very attractive taking into account the fact that our criminal procedure law is fashioned largely along the English system hence the similarity in the provisions of our Act and its English equivalent. However, constitutional argument can be raised to support a narrower interpretation. 
